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1 Introduction
Lebanon is currently facing its biggest fiscal crisis since its independence. Public debt now
stands at more than 150% of GDP and will continue to rise if adjustment measures are not
taken quickly. Until now, the government is in discussions with the International Monetary
Fund to find a way out of this crisis and probably restructure its public debt. Among the
suggested solutions, the elimination of certain consumer subsidies and some value-added tax
(VAT) exemptions are considered.
Lebanon subsidizes flour, wheat, bread, and indirectly electricity.1 There are VAT ex-
emptions of non-processed food and diesel.2 It is surprising that policies that would induce
a sharp increase in the price of basic food items are even considered. Policymakers usually
avoid such policies and typically look for policies that would mitigate the impact of increas-
ing food prices. The rationale behind such hesitation can be found in Bellemare (2015).
Using monthly data at the international level, Bellemare (2015) shows that rapid increases
in food prices can explain the emergence of social conflict. This empirical evidence should
be taken into account in the present policy discussions since ESCWA (2016) shows that a
significant part of the Lebanese population suffers from food insecurity.3
In such a context, it is essential to look for alternative sources of public finance consol-
idation. The objective of this article is to propose some of these alternative avenues. We
use partial information on surveys of consumer finances that we obtained from the Cen-
tral Administration of Statistics of the Lebanese government and seek to identify indirect
tax reforms that would improve any rank-dependent social welfare function that is averse
to inequality. To do so, we adopt a positional dominance approach developed in Yitzhaki
1Allowing Électricité du Liban to run recurring deficits is akin to subsidize electricity.
2Health, real estate, educational, financial, insurance and banking services and the leasing of residential
property are also exempt but we do not consider these expenditures in this short paper.
3ESCWA (2016) shows that 49% of the Lebanese reported being concerned about their ability to pay for
enough food and 31% of the population reported not being able to eat enough nutritious food at all times.
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and Slemrod (1991) and Makdissi and Mussard (2008). In addition, we adapt a method of
Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2008) to this positional dominance framework, allowing for
the identification of the maximum efficiency costs that would maintain the welfare increase
of these reforms.
Our paper includes three contributions to the literature. The most important contribu-
tion of the paper is to provide a preliminary analysis of the potential redistributive impacts
of eliminating food subsidies in Lebanon. In this regard, our paper relates to Salti and
Chaaban (2010) who studied the impact on inequality and poverty of a rise in the VAT in
Lebanon. Salti and Chaaban (2010) use an Almost Ideal Demand System as the economet-
ric model for their analysis. In this paper, we offer a complementary type of analysis by
not imposing any mathematical structure on the demand system. We also make a modest
contribution to the methodological literature on two aspects. First, we propose a restricted
dominance version of the positional dominance conditions of Makdissi and Mussard (2008).
Second, we adopt the method of identifying sets of economic efficiency ratios proposed by
Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2008) in a context of positional dominance.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
methodological framework. Section 3 presents the Lebanese fiscal context and some reforms
that would increase social welfare in Lebanon. Finally, the last section presents a conclusion
and avenues for future research.
2 Methodological framework
Assume that we have an economy with K consumer goods. Let q represent the vector of
prices for these K goods and t represent the vector of taxes. In this framework, a subsidy
on good k consists of a negative value of tk. If we assume that producer prices are set to
1 and invariant to changes in taxes,4 we have qk = 1 + tk. Assume that income, y ∈ ℜ+
4This assumption is reasonable in a small open economy.
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is also invariant to changes in consumer prices. Since we are interested in price changing
policies, the welfare indicator of interest will be real income yR = ρ(y, q, qR) that gives the
income required under a reference price vector qR to yield the same consumer welfare than
an income y under price vector q. We assume that this real income is distributed according
to a cumulative distribution function FY .
When an analyst wants to assess the impact of a price changing policies on social wel-
fare, there are three important measurement issues that needs to be overcome. First, one
needs to estimate the impact of the price change on individual consumers. The second
measurement challenge consists in choosing a social welfare function to measure the social
impact of marginal tax reform. Finally, one needs to estimate the impact of a tax reform
on government tax revenues. In addition to these usual issues, in the context of Lebanon,
the raw survey data that researchers usually need to perform their analysis may not be
accessible. In this section, we present and adapt methodologies developed by Yitzhaki and
Slemrod (1991), Makdissi and Mussard (2008) and Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2008) to
tackle the three measurement issues. In addition, we will explain how to use group data
when the analyst does not have access to the survey data.
2.1 Estimating the impact of a price change on individual consumers
Estimating the impact of a tax reform on consumer welfare may be sensitive to a number
of theoretical and econometric assumptions. This issue is very salient when one aims at
finding a globally optimal tax system. However, as pointed out by Woodrow Wilson, “We
shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified, not as it might be
if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon; and step by step we shall make it what
it should be.”5 For this reason, in this paper, we follow Feldstein’s (1976) suggestion and
focus on marginal tax reforms. In such context, estimating the impact of a tax reform
5Quote from Feldstein (1976).
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on an individual consumer does not require any assumption on the functional form of the
Walrasian demands or utility function. It can be assessed from the observed data alone.
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) point out that, if one uses the actual price vector as a reference
price vector, Roy’s identity implies that
∂ρ(y, q, qR)
∂tk
∣∣∣∣
q=qR
= −xk (FY (y), q) , (1)
where xk(p, q) = E[Xk|Y = F
−1
Y (p), q] is the expected consumption of good k at the income
level corresponding to the pth quantile of the distribution of real income. In this context,
the marginal average welfare cost of increasing the tax on good k on consumer is given by
Xk(q) =
∫ 1
0
xk(p, q)dp. (2)
2.2 Choosing a social welfare function to measure of social impact of
marginal tax reform
We assume a social planner with a rank-dependent social welfare function that is a functional
of the marginal cumulative distribution of real income (or real total expenditures), FY :
W (FY ) =
∫ 1
0
ω(p)Q(p)dp, (3)
where Q(p) = F−1Y (p) is the quantile function associated with FY and ω(p) ∈ ℜ+ is a social
weight function such as
∫ 1
0 ω(p)dp = 1. In this context, W (FY ) can be seen as a weighted
average of income levels. Since ω(p) is non-negative, this social welfare function obeys the
ethical principle of monotonicity that stipulates that an increase of income of one person,
everything being hold constant, should not be viewed negatively by the social planner. If in
addition, we impose ω′(p) ≤ 0, the social welfare function obeys the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle that stipulates that a transfer from a richer to a poorer person, everything else
being held constant, should not decrease social welfare. This principle is also referred to
as inequality aversion. The widest class of rank-dependent social welfare functions, Ω2, can
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thus be defined as the set of all rank-dependent social welfare function obeying monotonicity
and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.6
It is possible to impose more structure on the class of admissible social welfare functions.
One additional restriction that we consider in this paper is the principle of dual diminishing
transfers that stipulates that a progressive transfer is more valuable if it happens at lower
socioeconomic ranks (see Mehran, 1976; Kakwani, 1980; Chateauneuf, Gajdos and Wilthien,
2002; and Makdissi and Mussard, 2008). This additional restriction implies that ω′′(p) ≥ 0.
The class of rank-dependent social welfare function obeying monotonicity, the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle and the principle of dual diminishing transfers is denoted by Ω3 ⊂ Ω2.
This additional restriction may be useful when a tax reforms cannot be identified for all
rank-dependent social welfare functions belonging to Ω2.7
2.3 The impact of a marginal tax reform on government budget
Let us assume that we want the reform to be budget neutral. Alternatively, one may see
this as a reallocation exercice of taxes once a government has decided on the size of per
capita indirect tax revenue. Let R(q) =
∑K
k=1 tkXk(q) be the actual indirect tax revenue.
The impact of changing taxe rates on good j and ℓ is given by
dR(q) =
[
Xj(q) +
K∑
k=1
tk
∂Xk(q)
∂tj
]
dtj +
[
Xℓ(q) +
K∑
k=1
tk
∂Xk(q)
∂tℓ
]
dtℓ. (4)
Assume that a policymaker wants to increase (decrease) the tax (subsidy) on good j in
order to finance a decrease (increase) of the tax (subsidy) of good ℓ in a budget neutral
framework. Budget neutrality implies dR(q) = 0. Under this assumption, reorganization of
equation (4) yields
dtj = −γℓj
(
Xℓ(q)
Xj(q)
)
dtℓ, (5)
6Makdissi and Mussard (2008) give a formal definition of Ω2. In addition to a non-positive first order
derivative of the social weight function, they assume that this social weight function vanishes at p = 1, or
mathematically, that ω(1) = 0.
7In their formal definition of Ω3, Makdissi and Mussard (2008) also assume that the derivative of the
social weight function vanishes at p = 1, or mathematically, that ω′(1) = 0.
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where
γℓj =
(
Xℓ(q) +
∑K
k=1 tk
∂Xk(q)
∂tℓ
Xℓ(q)
)/Xj(q) +∑Kk=1 tk ∂Xk(q)∂tj
Xj(q)
 . (6)
The numerator in equation (7) gives the marginal tax revenue of a marginal increase of
the tax on good ℓ per unit of average welfare cost of this price increase on consumers.
Equivalently, it is the inverse of the marginal efficiency cost of public funds generated
by taxing ℓ, MEFCℓ. Similarly, the denominator represents the inverse of the marginal
efficiency cost of public funds generated by taxing j, MEFCj . The economic interpretation
of γℓj is then the economic efficiency cost of taxing j relative to the economic cost of taxing
ℓ:
γℓj =
MECFj
MECFℓ
. (7)
2.4 Identifying socially improving tax reforms
The identification of socially improving tax reforms can be achieved through comparisons
of concentration curves. The canonical concentration curve of good k, also referred as the
second order concentration curve, is defined as
C2k(p) =
∫ p
0
xk(u, q)du. (8)
Makdissi and Mussard (2008) also define the 3rd order concentration curve of good k as
C3k(p) =
∫ p
0
C2k(u)du. (9)
Following Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and Makdissi and Mussard (2008), one can identify
a tax reform that increases social welfare for all rank-dependent social welfare function in
Ωs (s ∈ {2, 3}) by increasing marginally the tax on good j to decrease marginally the tax
on good ℓ if and only if
Csℓ (p)− γℓjC
s
j (p) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
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There is an intuitive interpretation of the above result if one focuses on the second order.
The value of the second order concentration curve at rank p is the cumulative expenditures
for all rank below p. Since all inequality averse social weight functions are decreasing in
ranks, a potential loss at one social rank can be compensated by a gain at a lower rank.
In such context, it makes sense to check if there is a cumulative gain of the reform at each
rank.
Inspection of equation (10) indicates that the dominance result is contingent to a given
value of the ratio of the marginal efficiency cost of public funds, γℓj . Any estimate of
this ratio is contingent to strong econometric assumptions on the structure of the demand
system. In order to avoid relying on such strong assumptions, in Section 2.5, we build
on Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2008) and propose a method to identify sets of values
of γℓj that are compatible with a dominance result. To identify these sets, it is useful
to lay out a restricted dominance result. Assume that we want to consider a subset of
social weight functions Ωs(p∗) ⊂ Ωs (s ∈ {2, 3}) that includes only rank-dependent social
welfare functions having social weight functions imposing a social weight of 0 for social
ranks p ≥ p∗. Building on Makdissi and Mussard (2008)8, one can easily show that a tax
reform that marginally increases the tax on good j to decrease marginally the tax on good ℓ
increases social welfare for all rank-dependent social welfare function in Ωs(p∗) (s ∈ {2, 3})
if and only if
Csℓ (p)− γℓjC
s
j (p) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, p
∗]. (11)
Although it may seem arbitrary to apply restricted dominance, it is worth mentioning that if
p∗ is high enough, the results obtained are more general than in a poverty analysis context.
8The results is obtained directly from equation (22) in Makdissi and Mussard (2008) and the assumption
that social weight of 0 for social ranks p ≥ p∗.
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2.5 Identifying sets of efficiency ratios compatible with a socially improv-
ing tax reform
Let us define a function δsℓj(p) = C
s
ℓ (p)/C
s
j (p). Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2008) interpret
δℓj(p) as the distributive benefit of taxing good j instead of taxing good ℓ. Using this new
function, one can rewrite equation (11) as
δsℓj(p) ≥ γℓj ∀p ∈ [0, p
∗]. (12)
Equation (12) yields to an interesting economic interpretation of the dominance result.
Since δℓj(p) is the distributive benefit of taxing good j instead of taxing good ℓ and since
γℓj represents the economic efficiency cost of taxing j relative to the economic cost of taxing
ℓ, equation (12) can be interpreted as imposing that the distributive benefit of the tax
reform should exceed its economic efficiency cost for all income ranks in [0, p∗].
Let us now define a maximum efficiency ratio, γsℓj(p
∗), that will give us an upper limit to
the set of efficiency ratios compatible with a socially improving tax reform. Using equation
(12), one can identify this upper limit as
γsℓj(p
∗) = inf{δsℓj(p) |p ∈ [0, p
∗]} (13)
Using this upper limit, one can assess that a tax reform that marginally increases the
tax on good j to decrease marginally the tax on good ℓ increases social welfare for all
rank-dependent social welfare functions in Ωs(p∗) (s ∈ {2, 3}) and for all values of γℓj ∈
[0, γsℓj(p∗)].
2.6 Identifying potential socially improving tax reform with group data
As we mention earlier, in some cases, researchers do not have access to household survey
data. If one does not have access to the data but has access to average expenditures for
income groups, it is still possible to identify potential socially improving tax reforms. We
use the term potential to highlight the fact that any evidence based policy recommendation
8
should be made using the complete data set and applying the appropriate statistical infer-
ence techniques. Assume that one has access only to average consumption by predefined
income groups. Assume that we have G ordered income groups, each one with their average
income yg and average consumption of goods xk(g). Assume that each group represents a
proportion wg of the total population. If we define p0 = 0, one can identify the interval of
social ranks that is covered by each group as:
[pg−1, pg] =
[
g−1∑
i=1
wi,
g∑
i=1
wi
]
(14)
One can still get an approximation of the concentration curves using the following expres-
sions:
C2k(pg) =
1
Xk(q)
G∑
i=1
1(yi ≤ yg)wixk(i), (15)
C3k(pg) =
1
Xk(q)
G∑
i=1
1(yi ≤ yg)
pg − pi
2
wixk(i). (16)
The values of Csk(p) for p ∈ (pg−1, pg) are then obtained by simple linear interpolation.
3 Potential socially improving tax and subsidy reforms in
Lebanon
The Central Administration of Statistics has given us some excel files with information
on expenditures by income groups based on the 2004/2005 National Survey of Households
Living Conditions (NSHLC) of Lebanon.9 In this section, we use this partial information to
perform our analysis. The NSHLC is a cross-sectional survey that is representative at both
national and mohafaza levels. This survey is the result of a joint effort from the Central
Administration of Statistics and Capacity Building for Poverty Reduction: a Ministry of
Social Affairs-UNDP project. It monitors housing conditions, access to basic services and
income-related indicators and consumption at the household level. The survey is composed
9In order to validate the information contained in the many excel files, we have cross-validated their
computed averages in one file using proportions in other excel files. To our best of our knowledge, the
numbers seem accurate or at least consistent with one another.
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of a sample of 13,003 households, which equates to 56,000 individuals. Expenditure data
were collected from a sub-sample of 7,431 observations that can be assumed to be fairly
representative at national and mohafaza levels. It is worth noting that the data represent
the status of households in Lebanon as of 2004/2005. The information is dated from 15
years. Many consumer goods, such as intelligent mobile phone, were not common back
then. The war of 2006 between Israel and Lebanon and the Syrian civil war happened since
then. This last event has changed substantially the demographics of the country with a
very large influx of Syrian refugees. The results should be interpreted with care. However,
for the main consumption categories analyzed in this section, the results are still a good
starting point to start a policy discussion.
Lebanon has a VAT of 11% on consumption goods. It also has a system of subsidies
on energy and food. Electricity benefits from direct cash transfers to Électricité Du Liban
allowing it to run with recurring deficits. This implies that electricity is implicitly subsi-
dized. There is also a VAT exemption on diesel. This VAT exemption is applied to all use of
diesel. One of this use is transportation but other important usages are diesel based housing
heating and private electricity generators that sell electricity to consumers when Électricité
du Liban cuts the delivery.10 In 2007/2008, following the international food price crisis,
the government of Lebanon reintroduced subsidies on wheat, bread and flour. As we write
these lines, the Government of Lebanon is planning to restructure its public debt and there
are discussion to eliminate many of these subsidies, including those on food. Although the
authors of this paper agree that it would be desirable to move from consumption subsidies
to real means-tested social transfer programs and a progressive income taxation system,
such move cannot be efficiently implemented before reviewing the governance structure of
the public sector of the country.11 Until a good governance structure is imposed on the
10To this date, Électricité du Liban has never been able to provide a 24 hours of service of electricity per
day. Each Lebanese household has to buy part of its electricity from a private diesel electricity generator.
11The country’s economy is essentially a crony capitalist economy where politicians and some en-
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public sector allowing for the efficient implementation of means-tested direct cash transfers,
at least food subsidies should be maintained since an important proportion of the Lebanese
population suffers from food insecurity. The objective of the analysis presented in this sec-
tion is to identify some avenues for tax/subsidy reforms that would allow keeping subsidizing
food at a given public budget level by identifying tax sources to finance these subsidies.
In the partial data we have, there is a category for expenditures on bread and cereals.
We compare this category of expenditure with expenditures on fuels and lubricants for
personal transportation. Figure 1 displays the second order concentration curve of these
two categories of expenditures. Since we don’t have access to the raw survey data, we cannot
estimate a demand system for Lebanon. Instead, we estimate the upper bounds of sets of
admissible efficiency ratios for a tax reform that increases the tax on fuels and lubricants
for personal transportation to increase the subsidy on bread and cereals.
In order to estimate upper bounds for the efficiency ratio at the second order, one needs
to set a value for p∗, the maximum social rank of interest for the policymaker. We will
only use one value of that threshold: p∗ = 0.9. This choice is motivated by the fact that
Assouad (2019) shows that average income growth was -2% over the period from 2005 to
2014. During the same period, the incomes of the upper decile increased substantially. In
addition, Assouad (2019) shows that 57.1% of all incomes in Lebanon is held by this top
decile and 23.4% is held by the top percentile. Using this value of p∗ = 0.9, we find an upper
bound is γ2ℓj(0.9) = 1.19. This means that a tax reforms that increases the tax on fuels and
lubricants for personal transportation and uses the proceeds to subsidize bread and cereals
would increase social welfare for any rank-dependent social welfare function belonging to
Ω2(0.9) and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.19]. At the third order, the two upper
bounds of interest are γ3ℓj(0.9) = 2.01 and γ
3
ℓj(1) = 1.72. A tax reforms that increases the
trepreneurs work hand in hand to extract rents rather than engage in activities that promote economic
growth. For more details on this issue, the reader can refer to Diwan and Haidar (2019).
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tax on fuels and lubricants for personal transportation and uses the proceeds to subsidize
bread and cereals would then increase social welfare for any rank-dependent social welfare
function belonging to Ω3(0.9) and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 2.01] or for any
rank-dependent social welfare function belonging to Ω3 and all economic efficiency ratios
γℓj ∈ [0, 1.72]. Just to get an idea of the values one can get when estimating these efficiency
ratios from an econometric demand system, we refer to Duclos, Makdissi and Araar (2014)
who have estimated an efficiency ratio when transportation cost are taxed to subsidize food
with an econometric model of a demand system for Mexico.12 The value of their estimated
efficiency ratio is γ̂ℓj = 1.04 which is way below the upper bounds of all our set of admissible
efficiency ratios. In conclusion, eliminating VAT on diesel and increasing the taxation on
fuels and lubricants for personal transportation would be welfare improving if an important
part of the proceed is used to maintain subsidies that impact on the price of bread and
cereals. In addition, a higher tax rate on these fuels has a double dividend component since
it will deter polluting activities.
Before turning to the analysis of other tax reforms, let us discuss briefly the values of
efficiency ratios. As mentioned earlier, Duclos, Makdissi and Araar (2014) have estimated
all these ratios in the context of a Mexican demand system. Just to get a grasp of the
potential values of all efficiency ratios, all the values Duclos, Makdissi and Araar (2014) do
not exceed 1.201.
Let us now consider an alternative reform. If one wants to protect the food security of
the population, a subsidy on all non-processed food categories (Bread and cereals, Meat,
Fish and Seafood, Milk and Cheese, Oils and Fats, Fruits, Vegetables) may be introduced
by taxing transportation costs or increasing the VAT on all other expenditures categories.
Let us first look at transportation costs. The concentration curves of the expenditures on
12It would have been interesting to get a similar value from Salti and Chaaban (2010). Unfortunately,
they do not consider this ratio in their paper and the information on their price-elasticity alone did not
allow us to compute this value.
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non-processed food and transportation cost curves are displayed in Figure 2. The estimated
upper bounds of sets of admissible efficiency ratio for a tax reform that increases the tax
on fuels and lubricants for personal transportation γ2ℓj(0.9) = 1.40, γ
3
ℓj(0.9) = 2.17 and
γ3ℓj(1) = 1.90. Increasing the taxation of transportation costs to finance a subsidy on
non-processed foods would be socially improving for all social welfare function belonging
to Ω2(0.9) and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.40], for all social welfare function
belonging to Ω3(0.9) and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 2.17], and all social welfare
function belonging to Ω3 and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.90]. However, one
may worried that the level of per capita expenditures on transportation costs is only 72.5%
of the per capita expenditures level on non-processed food. In this context, it may put
too much fiscal pressure on this consumption category. In order to address this issue,
we have also investigated the possibility of increasing taxation on all other expenditures
to finance a subsidy on expenditures on non-processed food. The concentration curves are
displayed in Figure 3. For this comparisons, the estimated upper bounds of sets of admissible
efficiency ratio for a tax reform that increases the tax on fuels and lubricants for personal
transportation γ2ℓj(0.9) = 1.21, γ
3
ℓj(0.9) = 1.42 and γ
3
ℓj(1) = 1.36. This reform would
be socially improving for all social welfare function belonging to Ω2(0.9) and all economic
efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.21], for all social welfare function belonging to Ω3(0.9) and all
economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.42], and all social welfare function belonging to Ω3 and
all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.36].
Finally, we consider the possibility of increasing more the taxation on fuel and lubricant
for private vehicles to reduce the increase of the general VAT. In order to get an idea of
the desirability of this proposition, we consider a reform that would increase the tax on fuel
and lubricant for private vehicles (and eliminating the VAT exemption on diesel) and use
the proceeds to reduce taxation on all other expenditures. One can also see this as a way to
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reduce the burden of the previously mentioned reforms. Second order concentration curves
for these expenditures are displayed in Figure 4. There would not be a socially improving tax
reforms at the second order since the concentration curves cross at higher socioeconomic
ranks. However, dominance results can be obtained if one only considers social welfare
functions obeying the principle of dual diminishing transfers. Third order concentration
curves for these expenditures are displayed in Figure 5. Since these curves do not cross, we
estimate the upper bounds of the sets of admissible efficiency ratios and get γ3ℓj(0.9) = 1.39
and γ3ℓj(1) = 1.25. This indicates that increasing taxation on fuel and lubricant for private
vehicles (and eliminating VAT exemption on diesel) would be socially improving for all social
welfare function belonging to Ω3(0.9) and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.39], and
all social welfare function belonging to Ω3 and all economic efficiency ratios γℓj ∈ [0, 1.25].
4 Conclusion
In this short article, we have explored some avenues of tax reform that could improve social
welfare for wide classes of rank-dependent social welfare functions. These result are robust
to the assumptions on the econometric demand system, the chosen social welfare function
and large sets of economic efficiency ratios. The implication is that one cannot obtain the
opposite results under any reasonable assumptions using the same data. These preliminary
analyses should help policymakers seeking solutions to the current fiscal crisis. The results
show that these policymakers should be reluctant to eliminate food subsidies and should
even consider extending these subsidies to other food categories. These subsidies could be
financed entirely by raising VAT, eliminating the VAT exemption on diesel and imposing a
surcharge on energy used in motor vehicles.
It is important to remain cautious about the analytical results of this article being based
on partial data. Policy recommendations should eventually be based on an analysis of the
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survey microdata available to the government. Policymakers should also consider developing
a microsimulation model using these microdata that would allow them to study the potential
distributional impacts of their current and future reforms. Our recommendation to use food
subsidy is linked with the context where no progressive taxation and means tested transfer
programs exist. We strongly believe that once the Lebanese government has solved its
governance issues, it would be desirable to have a redistributive policy based on a progressive
taxation of income and direct means-tested programs. The analysis of Assouad (2019)
indicates that there is a large source of unexploited government revenue if one imposes
very high income tax rates at the top of the income distribution in Lebanon. Ultimately,
redistribution through indirect taxation and subsidies should only play a marginal role in
redistribution.
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Figure 3: Non-processed foods vs all other expenditures
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